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Summary. We explore the likely effect of Brexit on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) through
its possible effect on the benchmark variables that characterize the macroeconomy. For this we
propose the use of a Markov regime switching structural vector auto-regression to distinguish
between the volatile and stable states of the economy and account, among other effects, for the
contemporaneous effects that the frequency of FDI innately generates. Our findings suggest
that, if Brexit triggers a sterling depreciation in the current economic climate, this will fuel a
prolonged negative effect on FDI. FDI flows may be positively affected (at most) by a sterling
depreciation after Brexit only if this event drives the UK economy to a period of highly volatile
growth, inflation, interest and exchange rates: a scenario that is rather unlikely. And, even then,
the sterling depreciation benefits would last for only a short period of time.
Keywords: Brexit; Currency volatility; Economic growth; Inward investment; Markov switching;
Stuctural vector auto-regression
1. Introduction
Since the outcome on the UK’s exit (‘Brexit’) from the European Union (EU) referendum there
has been much comment on the likely nature of the UK’s trading relationship with the EU and
the rest of the world. However, despite its importance to the UK economy, the effect on inward
foreign direct investment (FDI) received little comment during the referendum debate, and only
more recently have the positions of, for example, the Japanese car makers in the UK been the
focus of attention. This is despite the fact that the UK has been for 40 years not merely open
to inward investment but has actively sought foreign investment across all sectors. Many UK
and non-UK ﬁrms have taken the opportunity to develop supply chains that cross into and out
of the UK several times. The position of these ﬁrms, and the capacity for the UK to continue
to attract inward FDI, is potentially one of the most important economic aspects of the UK’s
leaving the EU.
It is well known that the UK has a long running trade deﬁcit, but what has received much
less attention is the extent to which the adverse long-term effects of this have been offset by the
quantity of inward FDI that the UK attracts. Hitherto, any analysis of the likely effect of Brexit
in terms of ﬁrm location decisions has focused on seeking to explore the extent to which such
decisions have historically been inﬂuenced by the UK’s membership of the EU. A more targeted
approach would be to explore the short and long-term dynamics of FDI into theUK, and to use
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Fig. 1. When the UK trade deficit masks inward FDI: , the UK’s quarterly trade deficit (in billions of
pounds); , the UK’s FDI inflows (in billions of pounds)
them to infer the implications of Brexit. This is the approach that we propose. Consequently,
the purpose of this paper is to explore the likely effect on inward investment of Brexit, with a
particular focus on distinguishing between the long-term drivers of inward investment into the
UK, and the effect of short-term volatility.
This is a very timely issue. In the run up to, and since the referendumon, theUK’smembership
of the EU in June 2016, a debate has developed both within the academic literature, but most
notably within the popular press, concerning the potential effect on theUK economy of a looser
relationship between the UK and EU, through Brexit (see for example Crafts (2016)). However,
the focus of this discussion, even 20 months after the referendum, has been on the effect on
‘trade’, with the focus being on the trade in ﬁnished goods, rather than, say, the importance of
value chains that cross countries, sometimes several times. Politicians now appear to be waking
up to the importance of inward investment following, for example, warnings from the Japanese
Ambassador.
The importance of this issue stems from the fact that Brexit will be the ﬁrst example of a
developed economy leaving a customs union, but also from the fact that inward investment is
particularly consequential to the UK economy. The UK is one of the most, if not the most,
open economies in the world and has been running for a long time a well-known trade deﬁcit.
This, however, is largely masked by the amount of inward FDI that the UK attracts (Fig. 1).
In many sectors, more than 50% of the value added in the UK is generated by foreign-owned
ﬁrms, and overall more than 50% of the private sector research and development in the UK
is foreign owned. Because of this, supply chains in many high value sectors are dominated by
foreign ﬁrms and, by extension, many of the UK’s regions are reliant on inward investment for
economic development.
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Even more interestingly, Brexit raises a more general issue that the literature on FDI has yet
to address. In particular, there has been a plethora of papers focusing on the effect of joining a
free-trade area or a customs union and especially the EU; still, we know surprisingly little about
a reverse move, leaving a free-trade area or a customs union, since the noteworthy instances are
too few to draw even speculative conclusions. (The Seychelles andMadagascar left the Southern
African Development Community for a period, and membership of the Central European Free
Trade Agreement when a country joins the EU. To the best of our knowledge these are the only
examples of countries leaving a customs union.) The naive approach, which was sometimes
offered by politicians in the run up to the referendum and indeed by some for the 12 months up
to the 2017UKgeneral election but dismissed almost unanimously by policymakers, academics
and the popular press, would be simply to assume that the effect on FDI would simply be zero,
with new opportunities offsetting any detrimental effects. And yet, whatmay happen to (inward)
FDI ismore than an important concern; it is a centrepiece economic criterion tomake a decision
to remain or not in a free-trade area or a customs union. Given that the country that considers
such a move is the UK, and that the union that it involves is the EU, having a framework to
study how FDI could possibly react to such an event is as timely an issue as it can ever be.
Moreover, although a relevant literature is starting to develop concerning Brexit and inward
investment, this merely extends the literature on spatial distributions of FDI to the question
of Brexit (see for example Bruno et al. (2016) or Simionescu (2017)). Speciﬁcally, the objective
so far in this literature has been to determine the magnitude of the (positive) ‘EU effect’ in
explaining FDI into the UK and, by doing so, to infer the (likely negative) effect post Brexit.
This logic, however, is ﬂawed, as it is likely to understate both the competing gravity effect
of the UK having to compete with the EU for foreign investment, but also the effect of the
volatility regime within which the UK will be leaving the EU and whether or not this event will
affect it. This was ignored, for example, by Gudgin et al. (2017) in their analysis of the effects
of Brexit. In this respect, by proposing to examine the dynamics of inward FDI in relation to
the macroeconomy by using the structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) paradigm, we are
offering a more complete picture of the impact of Brexit on inward FDI.
Speciﬁcally, we adopt the Markov regime switching SVAR framework of Ehrmann et al.
(2003) and depart substantially from the existing FDI literature in several ways but do so
primarily for three reasons: ﬁrst, to make a distinction between periods of economic stability
and periods of economic uncertainty, a feature that, apart from the fact that it enables us to
make reasonable conjectures about the post-Brexit economic environment, it allows us to treat
economic uncertainty as a systemic feature rather than an exogenous variable; second, to capture
the contemporaneous effect of the structural shocks, which is a feature that is crucial given the
low frequency (quarterly) measure of FDI, and which, surprisingly, has hardly been raised as
an issue in this literature; third, to address the problem of having to deal with composites of the
structural shocks that the reduced form VAR is subject to, which is a fundamental feature for
isolating the effect of the differentmacrovariables. (This third point is also the reasonwhy SVAR
modelswere developed in the ﬁrst place, namely to incorporate in theoreticalmodels (structures)
the ﬁne performance of (the atheoretical) VAR models at data ﬁtting and forecasting.) As a
result, it becomes possible to analyse robustly how shocks of each macrovariable in isolation
affect inward FDI ﬂows. Subsequently, the question about the possible effect of Brexit on
inward FDI can break down into a question of whether Brexit will drive the UK into a period
of economic uncertainty or not and a question of how shocks of the different macrovariables
affect inward FDI in each period. Consequently, we offer an approach that seeks to deepen our
understanding of FDI ﬂows, their drivers and how they ﬁt into the context of a macroeconomy,
which is also essential when it comes to discussing a multifaceted event such as Brexit.
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Using macroeconomic data since the 1960s, we show empirically that the greatest changes
in the structure of inward investment have been caused by currency ﬂuctuations and economic
uncertainty. This is perhaps not surprising when we consider how FDI is funded, and that entry
decisions are essentially based on the difference between the cost of investment (which one
assumes the parent incurs initially in its home country) and the discounted cash ﬂow from that
investment, which is earned in local currency. When our results are used as the prism through
which to portend the effect of Brexit on the UK’s inward FDI, we ﬁnd that, if Brexit triggers a
sterling depreciation in the current economic climate, this will fuel a prolonged negative effect
on inward FDI. Inward FDI ﬂows may be positively affected only by sterling depreciation
after Brexit if the latter drives the UK economy to a period of highly volatile growth, inﬂation,
interest and exchange rates, which is a scenario that is rather unlikely.And, even then, the sterling
depreciation beneﬁts cannot last long.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places our work within the FDI
time series literature and Section 3 provides some theoretical considerations about examining
the FDI aspect of Brexit. Section 4 presents our model whereas Section 5 presents our econo-
metric methodology. Section 6 discusses our empirical results. Finally, Section 7 contains our
concluding remarks.
The data that are analysed in the paper and the programs that were used to analyse them can
be obtained from
https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/hub/journal/1467985x/series-
a-datasets
2. Overview of the foreign direct investment time series literature
The literature on time series analysis of FDI ﬂows into the UK, or indeed on time series analysis
of macrolevel FDI data in general, has advanced surprisingly little since the analysis of Barrell
and Pain (1997). Typically, this has sought to address two classes of problem. The ﬁrst, which
is often within the standard Granger causality framework, involves estimating the relationships
either between FDI and trade or between FDI and economic growth (see for example Nair-
Reichert and Weinhold (2001)). The second, overwhelmingly within a standard univariate time
series setting, builds on Barrell and Pain (1997) to identify the determinants of FDI into, or
from, a given country (see for example Basu et al. (2003)).
In this respect, the multivariate time series set-up that we propose here seeks to build on the
existing literature following the works of Shan (2002), De Santis et al. (2004) and more recently
Tolentino (2010). This set-up develops fromTolentino’s (2010) critique of the existing literature,
concerning
‘the tenuous assumptions concerning the exogeneity and endogeneity of the variables; and additional
identiﬁcation problems arising from temporal restrictions when variables are themselves policy projec-
tions’.
In particular, we propose two methodological innovations in the empirical analysis of FDI
ﬂows. The ﬁrst involves the use of structural, rather than reduced form, VAR modelling. This
enables us to isolate the effect of the (structural) shocks on the FDI (in contrast, the error terms
in a reduced formVAR are composites of the structural shocks and therefore may bemisleading
with regard to the effect of each variate on FDI). Equally importantly, it enables us to identify
the contemporaneous effect of the other variables on FDI. This is particularly relevant for data
with low frequency sampling (FDI data are released every quarter but the effect of the other
variables on FDI is very unlikely to be so slow, which in turn means that at such low frequency
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it will inevitably manifest as contemporaneous). The second involves the use of a Markov
regime switching approach to capturing uncertainty. In other words, instead of incorporating
economic uncertainty in our model through some volatility proxying variable, we view it as a
systemic feature of the economy that manifests by varying the effect of the examined variables
on FDI. In this way, we can account for a large class of possible non-linearities, including for
example structural changes or periodicity of the business cycles, which is also a very attractive
characteristic when trying to gauge the effect of multifaceted events such as Brexit, with obvious
increases in volatility and economic uncertainty (among other types).
The remainder of this section discusses another key factor that inﬂuences FDI which we also
account for in our model, namely currency ﬂuctuations.
2.1. Importance of currency fluctuations
The existing literature explores the importance of both the level and the volatility of exchange
rates in explaining FDI (see for example Pain and van Welsum (2003)). The literature discusses,
though largely fails to isolate, the competing forces arising from exchange rate ﬂuctuations. The
essential premise is that, on the one hand, an appreciation in a country’s exchange ratemay deter
foreign investors as investing becomes nominally more expensive in home country currency. On
the other hand, currency appreciation increases the nominal value of assets that are held in the
host country, and potentially increases the discounted future proﬁt ﬂows of the foreign investors
(denominated in home currency) so retention of foreign investment becomes more likely. These
competing relationships explain why researchers such as Go¨rg and Wakelin (2002) have been
unable to determine the nature of the relationships between FDI and currency ﬂuctuations, and
why Pain and van Welsum (2003) referred to the ‘Gordian knot’ in terms of the relationships
between currency ﬂuctuations and, in modelling terms, the identiﬁcation problem.
However, although the existing literature is rather contradictory, what is clear is that currency
ﬂuctuations, and uncertainty over currency, have been linked to changes in FDI in various
settings. This issue is explored in a more recent literature that explores the relationship between
currency ﬂuctuations and uncertainty that may deter FDI. Boateng et al. (2015) have provided
a recent example of this theme, arguing that, of the two competing effects that exchange rates
may have on FDI, they expect the initial cost that is associated with currency appreciation
to outweigh the potential for greater returns over time, though they acknowledge that this is
an empirical question. Blonigen (1997) extended this argument, allowing for the possibility of
different ﬁrms responding differently to shocks in currency movements. In turn he found a
strong inverse relationship between currency movements and inward FDI into the USA. This is
a similar ﬁnding to the work of Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) who argued that, when ﬁrms are
engaged in FDI to achieve the lowest cost location for a given activity, then currency uncertainty
deters FDI. Currency uncertainty, unlike what we do here, is not viewed as an effect of the state
of the economy at speciﬁc points in time.
A key question in the wake of Brexit, therefore, is how the uncertainty, in the periods both
before and after the British Government invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, will manifest
itself. For example, there is an expectation that sterling will be both more volatile and subject to
a devaluation. (To some extent this scenario materialized immediately after the announcement
of the referendum results but it remains to be seen whether this will characterize the post-
Brexit period.) This would typically trigger inﬂation pressures, though itmay also boost exports.
Therefore, a focal aspect, andcontribution, ofouranalysis is about the effect that this uncertainty
will have on FDI, in both the short and the longer term.
The essential arguments were summed up inRuss (2004). The relationships between exchange
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rates, FDI and exchange rate volatility depend on the nature of the shocks that impact on the
ﬁrm. Russ (2004) for example showed that, where volatility arises, it is the source of the volatility
that determines the response in terms of FDI ﬂows, which is something that was not considered
in the literature discussed above. This develops the earlier argument by Campa (1993) that the
precise nature of the relationship between currency volatility and FDI depends on the nature
and level of sunk costs that are required to facilitate entry into the host country, which is in itself
a function of the expected level of currency volatility. The ﬁndings ofRuss (2004) are particularly
pertinent for the debate concerning Brexit, as they highlight that not merely volatility in the real
economy, but the source of that volatility is likely to impact on the relationship between currency
ﬂuctuations and FDI. This issue was explored in more detail by Chenaf-Nicet and Rougier
(2016). The analysis here is analogous to the analysis on gross capital ﬂows. For example, Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) explored the effect of the recent ﬁnancial crisis on aggregate ﬂows
by using a cross-country model. Their underlying premise is to link exchange rates ﬂexibility to
current account ﬂuctuation, exploring the role that capital ﬂows play in this adjustment. They
found that, in countries with exchange rate pegs, the post-crisis adjustment process occurred
through a change in ‘private non-banking ﬂows’ and that countries with large current account
deﬁcits experienced large-scale capital outﬂows. This suggests that, in terms of the relationship
between currency ﬂuctuations, that between customs union membership and FDI is worthy of
further consideration.
In addition tounderstanding thewider issueofBrexit,we seek todevelop the existing literature
which explores the relationship between currency volatility and FDI ﬂows. Much of the recent
literature in this area examines the effect of the euro, either in terms of the overall effect of
FDI into the EU, or in terms of membership of the euro of a given country. A more recent
literature, however, seeks to distinguish between the euro effect and the EU effect in terms
of explaining FDI ﬂows. This is essentially an empirical extension of the work of Flam and
Nordstro¨m (2008) based on the theoretical underpinnings of Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) and
this line of analysis highlights another important aspect of our contribution, namely in that we
seek to separate volatility in FDI ﬂows from volatility that is generated elsewhere in our model.
Dinga andDingova´ (2011) attempted for example to distinguish between the euro effect and the
EU effect, in explaining FDI ﬂows. Dinga and Dingova´ (2011) showed that, whereas the euro
effect declines as one allows for intercountry heterogeneity, the EU effect is positive and stable
in explaining bilateral FDI ﬂows. This suggests that there are two elements to the positive effect
that the UK’s membership of the EU has on its FDI ﬂows. Firstly, there are the trade creation
effects, which are associated with attracting FDI into the EU, from where ﬁrms can service EU
markets. In addition, there is a positive effect of intra-EU FDI, as companies perceive greater
certainty in the relationships between countries, and in institutions, when seeking to locate
certain activities.
Theoretically, this links the time series literature on volatility in currency more coherently
to the theoretical literature on FDI decisions. Schiavo (2007) for example found that, building
on the underpinnings of FDI of for example Markusen and Venables (1998), who argued that
customsunions have a positive effect onFDIby reducing currency uncertainty. This is essentially
an extension of the theoretical approach, treating customs unions or currency unions as a way of
reducing transaction costs and extending the boundaries of the ﬁrm (see for exampleHorstmann
and Markusen (1996)).
Overall, we therefore seek to develop this literature in two ways. First, we treat volatility
as a systemic feature. This is an empirical challenge which the macroeconomic literature has
addressed most recently with the Markov regime switching SVAR models that we propose as a
fruitful approach. It is our assertion that Brexit will generate volatility in sterling which in turn
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will lead tomore volatility in FDI ﬂows, at least for a relatively short period of time. As such, it is
essential to be able to treat volatility as a systemic feature of the economy and not merely as one
of the explanatory variables. As we show below, this is both theoretically and methodologically
important given the question at hand. Second, although the underlying long-run trend in FDI
is of interest, we build on the sizable literature on FDI that suggests that, at the ﬁrm level, sector
level and indeed the macrolevel, there is a high degree of persistence in FDI ﬂows, such that any
instability in FDI ﬂows will lead to a reduction in the short run.
3. Importance of Brexit for foreign direct investment
As is well understood, inward investment is of vital importance to the UK economy, not least
because of the employment opportunities that foreign ﬁrms create, often in areas of high unem-
ployment. Unsurprisingly, there are microeconomics-based debates concerning training effects,
productivity spillovers and secondary employment but possibly the most important contribu-
tion that inward FDI makes to an economy is in mitigating the effects on an almost permanent
trade deﬁcit (see Fig. 1). In this respect, those championing Brexit often comment on how trade
would be unaffected, so long as the UK were to stay within some looser trading arrangement
with the EU, clearly assuming that inward investment would remain unchanged. These debates,
however, are essentially taking place in a vacuum, given the paucity of knowledge about the
drivers in the variation of FDI into the UK over the past 50 years.
The empirical analysis that studies the effect of joining a customs or currency union typically
simply adds a dummyvariable to themodel in question tomake adistinctionbetween the periods
before and after the economy entered a union. However, given the lack of examples of countries
leaving customsunions, themost commonapproachwhen seeking to examine the likely effects of
exit (primarily in themainstreampress) is to reinterpret the evidence on the effect of joining from
the perspective of the reverse process. This is a fundamentally ﬂawed approach since it disregards
even the causes or directions of wider shocks that are associated with such a move as well as
any possible asymmetry. Perhaps more importantly, the pervasive modelling approach that has
been adopted so far is founded on exogenously deﬁned dummy variables to study the before
and after joining the union effect, effectively ignoring the signiﬁcant econometric advances of
the last three decades. Therefore, the approach that we propose is radically different from the
rest of the location analysis that has been performed in emerging literature in this area (see for
example Bruno et al. (2017) and Simionescu (2017)) and sheds some light on how Brexit may
affect inward FDI. We do this by building on the notion of examining the response of inward
FDI to shocks of the key macroeconomic variables, and subsequently associating this with the
wider economic environment. Before discussing our approach, however, it is worth examining
brieﬂy what the literature has concluded in terms of the relationship between FDI and customs
union membership.
3.1. Foreign direct investment and customs union membership
The initial literature that examined the potential effect on FDI ﬂows on a country’s accession to
a customs union essentially extended the well-understood concepts of ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade
diversion’ to the issue of FDI. This thenmakes a series of predictions concerning bothFDI ﬂows
into a country from outside the customs union, and also regarding intraunion FDI.Much of the
analysis that seeks to link FDI decisions of ﬁrms to country level decisions regarding economic
integration is based on the analysis of Rowthorn (1992).
These can be summarized as follows: ﬁrstly, that a country’s membership of a customs union
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makes it more attractive for inward investment from outside the region (Collie, 2011), with a
general increase in ‘interbloc’ FDI (Donnenfeld, 2003). This is in turn related to the ‘optimal
tariff ’ literature; see for example Blonigen andCole (2011), who applied themodel of Blanchard
(2010) to the caseofChinese accession to theWorldTradeOrganization.Theoretically, one could
adopt a similar analysis to the case of Brexit, concluding that the UK may seek to attract ‘tariff
jumping’ FDI at the expense of the EU. This is, however, not a position that those advocating
Brexit have yet adopted, for fear that retaliation from the EU would cause a reduction in FDI
to the UK from outside the EU. Bajo-Rubio and Lo´pez-Pueyo (2002) for example argued that
Spain became more attractive for non-EU inward investment as the EU moved towards the
single market in 1992.
The second argument concerns the expected reduction in intrabloc FDI, as ﬁrms seek to cap-
ture economies of scale by concentrating activities and then beneﬁtting from free trade to service
the different national markets. Here, the theoretical predictions concerning a reduction in intra-
EU FDI turned out to be somewhat wide of the mark; see for example Cantwell (1987) or more
recently Cardamone and Scoppola (2015). This essentially is because the theoretical analysis
failed to consider fully the relative importance of a reduction in the costs of co-ordinating activ-
ities across locations within a customs union, compared with the economies-of-scale effects in
production. The single market signiﬁcantly reduced the costs of co-ordinating activities across
European countries and, as a result, multinational ﬁrms remained dispersed with the EU. In-
deed, although ﬁrms have expanded into accession countries seeking lower production costs,
they have also retained activities near customers in rich markets. (This is often illustrated with
reference to the automotive industry, which has, within the EU, retained a relatively dispersed
production network, with very high levels of intraﬁrm trade; see for example Rhys (2004).) The
evidence, however, suggests that this effect in the case of the EU has not materialized, as ﬁrms
have sought to take advantage of the reduction in costs of co-ordinating activities within the EU,
and to engage in technology transfer as they seek the lowest cost locations for a given activity
(Barrell and Pain, 1999).
This highlights a key question within the Brexit debate. Whereas it is difﬁcult to characterize
the speciﬁc ‘leave’ position on this issue, it is clear that the dominant paradigm among leavers
hardened through 2017, evolving from a stated intention to stay in the customs union, to, by
March 2018, a stated intention to leave it. However, it is certain that the ‘harder’ the Brexit,
that is to say the further the UK is removed from the pillars of the single market, the more
challenging the business environment will be for inward investors seeking to use the UK as a
gateway to Europe; and, in the same vein, the inevitably higher transaction costs will make the
UK less attractive for FDI from the rest of Europe.
Of potentially equal importance is the association of Brexit with uncertainty in the business
environment. The exact mechanisms by which trade will be administered and the associated
costs for UK-based ﬁrms in co-ordinating activities in Europe are still uncertain. Predictably,
such costs will only increase if the UK seeks to diverge substantially from EU regulations
and standards. (Consider for example the institutions and regulations that govern the single
market, such as vehicle emissions requirements. Firms within the EU face one set of emissions
requirements, and so co-ordinate activities acrossEUplants,withvery large volumesof intraﬁrm
trade. The same can be said of food standards, electrical equipment etc. If these regulations
were to diverge, then the cost of co-ordinating activities would increase.) In this spirit, Los
et al. (2017) examined the spatial distribution of the likely effects of Brexit and highlighted the
issue of value chains that cross between the UK and the EU a number of times. When they
speculated on the likely outcome for these post Brexit, they made the point that the outcome
for many multinational ﬁrms will be to relocate supply chains to the EU, and then merely to
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import the ﬁnished product into the UK. In turn, this poses two related questions, the ﬁrst
regarding the effect on investment that is already here, and the second regarding the effect on
future investment. Los et al. (2017) made a very persuasive argument concerning why some
investors in the UK may leave, and, acknowledging that some FDI into the UK is reinvestment
by existing ﬁrms, we focus on the prospects for future investment. This is consistent with our
ﬁndings regarding new investment.
At the same time, the level of uncertainty in the business environment can be viewed as
both a determinant and an effect of the broader state of the UK economy in the aftermath
of Brexit. In this respect, its subsequent effect on FDI may be conditioned on the prevalent
stable or unstable economic regime in the post-Brexit era which we characterize, following
the mainstream paradigm, as the low or high volatility regime respectively. Consequently, our
analysis focuses on how inward investment responds to changes in the variables that reﬂect the
macroeconomic environment within which ﬁrms operate. At the same time we must allow for
the fact that this environment has changed over the years and is likely to change because of
Brexit, even for the short run. We do this by employing a time series approach to track the
dynamic relationship between FDI and the principal macrovariables, namely an SVAR model,
to separate also the effect of the different structural shocks on FDI, which we build within the
Markov regime switching framework, to encompass the possible effect of uncertainty that this
dynamic relationship might exhibit. This is what we explore in detail in Section 5.
There is of course a voluminous literature on the effect of inward FDI on the UK, most of it
based on sectoral or regional data, examining questions such as employment effects, contrasting
different regions of the UK, or alternatively the productivity or technology transfer effects.
Typically, this seeks to build on, or to challenge, the policy agenda concerning the beneﬁcial
effects of FDI, mainly at a local level.
Equally, there is a large literature, which conceptually is based at the level of the ﬁrm, and
essentially seeks to explain why a ﬁrmwould choose a particular location, or why some locations
prove more popular for FDI than others. These typically adopt a panel structure and focus on
combinations of demand (market size) and location factors (labour costs).
As such, the time series analysis, much of which is nearly 20 years old, takes this as a starting
point, and then seeks to explainobservedmacrolevelFDIﬂows in termsofothermacroeconomic
variables.
4. The model
The standard approaches to modelling the FDI decision start with one of two perspectives. The
ﬁrst perspective, which is built for example on Rowthorn (1992) or Horstmann and Markusen
(1996), is based on the assumption that a ﬁrm has two options in terms of servicing a foreign
market (or three, including licensing), namely exporting and investing, and that typically the
decision to service that market has already been made. Analyses with respect to economic
integration then seek to explore both the relative importance of factor endowments, relative
cost and market structure, and how these will change after a country enters a customs union.
Such changes are in turn used to explore potential location decisions of ﬁrms from within and
outside the customs union, after a union has been created. Ekholm et al. (2007), for example,
linked location decisions to production and trade costs post the formation of a customs union.
Initially, we may consider that the problem determining the effect of leaving a customs union
is analogous to this. However, in the case of the UK leaving the EU, what is rather expected is
the UK’s ‘opting out’ of the set of institutions that enforce the union while retaining some form
of membership of the free-trade area. Moreover, as the debate develops, it becomes evident
10 N. Driffield and M. Karoglou
that the main concern of business leaders and commentators, as well as policy makers, is not
the likely changes in inward investment into the UK that such an event may bring, but rather
the uncertainty that it will engender in terms of future investment ﬂows. Consequently, it seems
natural to base an analysis on the theoretical contribution ofAntras et al. (2009)who linkedFDI
to risk or volatility. There is a large empirical literature which seeks to link FDI decisions to risk,
though typically this is in terms of either sovereign risk (see for example Aizenman and Marion
(2004)), or the extent to which corruption increases agency problems and other transactions
costs, and therefore deters FDI (see for example Javorcik (2004) and Wei (2008)). (It should
be pointed out that the applied and theoretical literature ﬁnds rather complex relationships
between for example corruption and FDI, dependent on ﬁrst-mover advantage, the cohort of
indigenous ﬁrms and the potential for ﬁrst-mover advantage; see for example Hakkala et al.
(2008).)
We therefore adopt the approach that is used within the empirical literature, which is to treat
the FDI decision as a subset of the investment literature. The essential model of FDI is based
on the probability that a ﬁrm enters a given location (model I):
P(Entry)=φ1
{
T∑
p=0
(
1
1+ r
)p e∏
t+p
}
where T is the expected life of the investment, and r is the discount rate. This is clearly unob-
servable, but it can be written as a function of a vector of country level characteristics (model
II):
T∑
p=0
(
1
1+ r
)p e∏
t+p
=φ2.x1i/:
Within a time series setting, this is thenoperationalized, followingCampa (1993)who introduced
exchange rates into amodel of the FDI decision at the ﬁrm level. The analysis, which is based on
option theory, seeks to link the ﬁrm level decision to enter amarket through foreign production.
This links the investment decision, notmerely to the expected returns and the sunk costs of entry,
but also to the level of uncertainty, i.e. the volatility of the exchange rate:∫ ∞
0
.Rtp−w/ exp.−ρt/dt = R0p
ρ−μ −
w
ρ
 Rk
where Rt is the value of the exchange rate at time t, μ is the drift of the exchange rate, p is the
dollar price of the good, w represents the variable costs in foreign currency of producing the
good and ρ is the discount rate. According to this equation, the ﬁrm will enter as long as the
expected value of future dividends is greater than the cost of entry k. A model using pricing
theory will transform the previous equation on the decision to enter by the ﬁrm in the following
equation:
Rˆp
ρ−μ −
w
ρ
− Rˆp
.ρ−μ/β.σ/ = Rˆk
where Rˆ is the critical value of the exchange rate that triggers entry, β.σ/ is a known function
of the volatility of the exchange rate and f ′.0/ < 0. Therefore, the higher the volatility of the
exchange rate, the higher the level the exchange rate must be for the ﬁrm to decide to exercise its
option to enter themarket.AsCampa (1993) illustrated, thepresentmodel gives clearpredictions
on the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on foreign investment. It predicts that the higher the
uncertainty σ, and the degree of sunk investments k that are necessary to enter the market,
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the more valuable the option to enter will be and the fewer events of entry we shall observe. In
contrast, the higher the exchange rate and its rate of change, the higher the expectation of future
proﬁts from entering the market will be. Finally, the lower the variable costs of production w
with respect to other competitors, the more likely it is that entry will occur.
The link between this approach, and the trade-theory-based analysis of FDI of Rowthorn
(1992) and De Fraja and Norman (2004) was provided by Bergstrand and Egger (2007), who
linked FDI decisions to market size as well as distance, providing justiﬁcations for the use of
gravity equations toanalyseFDIpatterns (see for exampleBarbaNavaretti andVenables (2004)).
Omitting uncertainty from this highlights why previous analyses have found no relationship
between currency and FDI ﬂows. As the host currency appreciates, the cost in home country
currency of the investment increases, but so do expected returns.
Uncertainty, however, cannot simply be ignored. As model I demonstrates, when we intro-
duce uncertainty, then, whereas the expected return may not change, the variation or risk that
is attached to that investment increases, and the investment becomes less likely. But even in this
model the focus is on the expected value, rather than the variance, if that proxies uncertainty.
In fact, as was discussed by Blonigen and Piger (2014), although uncertainty is acknowledged
as an essential factor, it is seldom explored in the literature. In this respect, our approach is
similar to the underpinnings of Campa (1993), who sought to link investment to uncertainty.
In their case, uncertainty is assumed that it can be explicitly pinpointed through ﬂuctuations
in the real exchange rate and went on to show that exchange rate variability reduces domes-
tic investment. Also, they argued that these effects may be understated when we impose a
model with stable parameters. In our case, uncertainty is a systemic characteristic of the regime
that the economy ﬁnds itself in at each point in time. (Overall, in the Markov regime switch-
ing framework the high volatility economic regime is generally associated with high currency
uncertainty, and that the low volatility regime is generally associated with low currency un-
certainty. However, it does allow for (short-lived) spells of high currency uncertainty during
the low volatility regime and low currency uncertainty during the high volatility regime.) In
the context of the above model, this could be translated as setting β.σ/ to be also depen-
dent on the economy regime as identiﬁed through its projection on the interlinked dynamics
of the main variables that characterize a macroeconomy such as economic growth, inﬂation
and policy rates. Therefore, it should be expected that if uncertainty is important then eco-
nomic regimes that are characterized by higher volatility will attract lower levels of investment.
(There has been much speculation concerning why the UK did not suffer a larger fall in growth
after the referendum, though evidence is now emerging from the Ofﬁce for National Statistics
that the ‘Brexit bounce’ was fuelled by consumer spending, whereas long-term investment has
declined.)
In this spirit, our model seeks to link inward FDI to a vector of macroeconomic variables
and speciﬁcally to the shocks that each of the macroeconomic variables might exhibit. For this
we estimate an SVAR model identiﬁed by using a very ﬂexible (sign restrictions) scheme. In this
way, we can capture the contemporaneous effect of changes of each macrovariable onto FDI
ﬂows and, through the respective impulse–response graph, how this effect evolves over time.
Furthermore, we build our model within the Markov regime switching framework to make a
distinction between periods of high and low volatility in the economy, proxying in effect the
periods of high and low economic uncertainty. This enables us to observe how uncertainty,
as a feature of the whole economy now, inﬂuences the effect of the macrovariable shocks on
inward FDI. Finally, we endeavour to improve the robustness of our analysis by also looking at
mainstream variants of our model to explore whether our results are consistent across different
sets of modelling assumptions.
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In effect, akeyobjectiveof this approach is to combine theunderstanding thathasbeenderived
from the earlier time series analysis, which focused on providing econometric explanations of
the observed variation in FDI ﬂows, with the wider understanding of the relationship between
FDI and development. Consequently, our work can also be seen as an endeavour to develop
the well-understood albeit empirically limited literature (based on panel data analysis, building
for example on Borenzstein et al. (1998)) that examines the contributions that inward FDI can
make to growth. Exploring the effects of Brexit within this framework becomes then a natural
application to showcase the value of this approach.
5. Data and econometric methodology
In general, our approach is to look at the possibility of Brexit through well-studied time series
lenses. This allows us to ground our analysis explicitly on the UK and how its economy and
FDI have reacted to exogenous shocks over the last century or so. Consequently, we bypass,
instead of addressing head on, the insurmountable challenge of establishing analogies between
Brexit in the UK and similar events in other countries—which historically do not exist.
However, an investigation of the effect of such an extraordinary event in this way dictates, to
a large extent, the selection of variables: multiple-country data are hardly relevant because the
topic is country speciﬁc; and industry level data are inherently unsuitable because of their very
low frequency (typically annual) and short time span. A time series approach is therefore the
most suitable route to yielding data-based conjectures about the ‘Brexit effect’. In this respect
the macroeconomic literature has offered a solid platform to build on.
Subsequently, our data set spans the period 1963, quarter 1–2013, quarter 4 (quarterly fre-
quency), and contains, apart from the UK’s FDI, the gross domestic product (GDP), consumer
price index, foreign exchange rate against the US dollar and the policy interest rates. (The last
observation of the sample is due to the FDI series—theOfﬁce forNational Statistics has stopped
updating the particular (long) FDI series that we are using.) For robustness, we also undertake
our estimations by dropping the observations before the UK joined the European Communities
in 1976 to ensure that our results are not affected by the inclusion of observations before the
UK became a member of one of the early manifestations of what has now evolved into being
the EU. In anticipation of what we report in the results section (Section 6), it is worth noting
that our results are almost identical, as the model is robust to this change. Table 1 overviews the
statistical properties of the variables, transformed accordingly (standardized values for FDI,
differences for policy rate and log-differences for the rest) to ensure stationarity. (We discuss
our adopted method of analysis further down but the familiar reader may also observe that
we are effectively in the same set-up with the prevalent SVAR that solves a Neo-Keynesian
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of a macroeconomy (see for example
Table 1. Statistical overview of the data
Statistic FDI GDP Inﬂation Foreign Rate
growth exchange rate (difference)
(returns)
Mean 0.003 0.632 1.355 −0:274 −0:004
Standard deviation 1.002 0.998 1.460 5.025 0.263
Skewness 3.702 0.244 1.744 −0:760 0.410
Kurtosis 22.721 6.880 7.357 5.566 7.707
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Arestis et al. (2016)), which we augment with an inward FDI variable. This is no coincidence:
from another perspective, we are effectively interested in capturing how inward FDI interacts
with the macroeconomy (or, more precisely, with the factors that are widely viewed as capturing
the dynamics of the macroeconomy).)
In terms ofmethodology,we adopt aMarkov regime switching SVARapproach. This involves
a two-step procedure which brings together two important developments of VAR analysis:
estimation within the Markov regime switching framework to control, for example, for the
business cycle, and identiﬁcation of the underlying contemporaneous effects to enhance the
excellent performance of VAR models to ﬁt time series data with theoretical underpinnings.
In particular, estimating a (reduced form) VAR within the Markov regime switching frame-
work enables all estimated parameters to be state dependent. Schematically, it is given by
Xt = c.St/+
p∑
j=1
A.St/Xt−j +B.St/ut , .1/
Ω.St/=E[B.St/utu′t B.St/′]=B.St/Σu.St/B.St/′ .2/
where
Xt =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
FDIt
yt
πt
rt
Δlt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠, c.St/=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
c1, st
c2, st
c3, st
c4, st
c5, st
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠, u=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
u1, st
u2, st
u3, st
u4, st
u5, st
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
and FDI, y, π and r signify inward FDI ﬂows, GDP growth, inﬂation and foreign exchange
rates against the US dollar (log-) returns, Δl the ﬁrst difference of policy rates, S the regime (1
or 2 representing what are characterized as the low and the high volatility regime respectively)
and u the innovation terms. (This is a typical approach in the SVAR literature aimed at making
robust the estimation of the system against the highly persistent interest rates. Indeed, when
we tried the levels of interest rates, in some cases the impulse–responses were explosive. The
adoption of two regimes seems to be the tacit convention in the empirical literature, often
justiﬁed by the fact that it comes with a plausible and yet natural interpretation of what each
of the two regimes mean. It is worth noting, however, that it is also something that to a large
extent is dictated by the available information since introducing more regimes intensiﬁes the
curse of dimensionality that VAR models suffer from. For example, in this particular instance,
introducing a third regime would raise the number of parameters to be estimated to about 100
which would effectively discredit any inference that is drawn from such estimates owing to the
inevitable lack of a sufﬁciently long sample. Consequently, we, along with other similar studies,
are to some extent forced to follow the predominant paradigm—in fact, adopting two regimes
appears to be inevitable given the low (quarterly) frequency of FDI and the span of the available
data.) In this set-up, addressing the problem of identiﬁcation effectively refers to identifying
the impulse matrix B.St/, which can then be used to extract the contemporaneous interactions
between the elements of Xt . Identiﬁcation of B.St/ requires n2 restrictions within each regime
whereas estimation of B.St/ provides [n.n+1/=2] restrictions. This means that full identiﬁcation
requires another n.n− 1/=2 extra restrictions. Sims (1992) in his seminal SVAR paper derived
these restrictions by ordering the endogenous variables recursively.We choose the recursive form
of identiﬁcation following the scheme of Ehrmann et al. (2003). In our models, we impose the
restrictions that (normalized) FDI changes will respond positively to shocks in GDP growth,
inﬂation and exchange rate growth and negatively to shocks in interest rate changes. However, it
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is worth underlining that amain advantage of the aforementioned identiﬁcation approach is that
if a restriction is not valid then it will be rejected by the shape of the impulse–responses—i.e. the
shape of the impulse–response graph will not display what the restriction dictates. (It is worth
noting that, to maintain our degrees of freedom, our results regarding the various effects are
symmetric (for example, exchange rate depreciations and appreciations for each regime would
have the same effects in absolute magnitude on FDI albeit with different signs). Future studies
may relax this assumption.)
Model (1) and (2) (model A) is sufﬁciently general to allow us to incorporate regime shifts
for all parameters which means that it is not clear what distinguishes the various regimes.
Changes in the unobserved state variable could be associated with the phase of business cycles
(i.e. switches in the intercept), or with changes in the propagation mechanism (i.e. changes in
the dynamic structure of the auto-regressiveMarkov regime switching VAR coefﬁcients) or with
changes of theMarkov regime switchingVARerrors (i.e. changes in the variance of innovations).
Consequently, it is worth looking at the respective nested models to have a clearer picture about
the source of the regime shifts.
Model A, the general model that is presented in equations (1) and (2), accounts for the joint
contribution of all potential sources. In other words, apart from the effects that are contained
in the other two models (business cycle and luck) it also accounts for shifts in the propagation
mechanism, which are often views that are typically driven by changes in market expectations—
see for example Stock and Watson (1988), Pesaran et al. (1993), Pivetta and Reis (2007) and
Pancrazi and Vukotic (2013). Consequently, this model also captures the effect that changes in
the formation of market expectations have on FDI.
Model B is built under the assumption that only the intercepts change across regimes, whereas
the auto-regressive parameters and the variance–covariance matrix of reduced form shocks
remain constant. In this set-up, regimes are identiﬁed as low and high growth and high and low
inﬂation, in effect aiming at capturing the business cycle. Schematically, we have
Xt = c.St/+
p∑
j=1
AtXt−j +But , .3/
Ω=BΣuB′ .4/
where the impact matrix B remains constant across the different regimes (i.e. B.St/ = B/, which
also means that, since only c.St/ changes, the proﬁles of the impulse–responses remain the same
across the different regimes.
Finally, model C is built under the assumption that only the regime shifts are driven by luck,
following the main bulk of the literature on the Great Moderation. In other words, the regime
shifts are conﬁned to the variance of structural innovations whereas the impulse matrix B is
invariant across the St states, which is an approach that resembles those suggested by Rigobon
(2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003) for identiﬁcation of SVAR through heteroscedasticity.
However, it should be noted that here we relax the assumption that changes in the covariance
structure occur at ﬁxed points during the sample period. Schematically, we can have
Xt = c+
p∑
j=1
A.St/Xt−j +But , .5/
Ω=BΣu.St/B′: .6/
Lanne et al. (2010) showed that identiﬁcation of B can be achieved if
Ω.St/=BB′ for St =1,
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and
Ω.St/=BΦ.St/B′ for St =2, : : : ,N
where Φ.St/ is a diagonal matrix with positive elements. If there are only two regimes (i.e.
St =1, 2) identiﬁcation requires that the elements of Φ.St/ are distinct. Model C has been used
in the Great Moderation literature to test the null hypothesis of ‘good luck’. (From a certain
perspective it can also be considered the variant that is closest to the typical (single-regime)
SVAR model since apart from the innovation term the other parameter estimates (the intercept
and the coefﬁcients of the lagged dependent variables) will be the same across the two regimes.
Therefore, its impulse–responses should not be far from those that the simplest SVAR variant
would yield.)
6. Results
Overall, the ﬁltered probabilities of all three models (depicted in Fig. 2) ﬁt well the commonly
acknowledged periods of high and low volatility in the macroeconomic variables and more
generally the periods of relative economic stability in the UK economy (e.g. the turbulent 1970s
or the so-called UK Great Moderation from 1992 to 2008).
At this point, it is worth noting that, unlike the auto-regressive and especially VAR models,
the ﬁt of SVAR models is evaluated in the existing empirical literature overwhelmingly through
reporting the values of information criteria, primarily for the model selection (reported in
Table 2, together with the linearity—single-regime—test) and the impulse–response graphs,
for ensuring that the estimated model is stable and well behaved. (Theoretically speaking, if we
could specify up front and properly calibrate the underlying DSGE model of the UK economy
that perfectly ﬁts the data, then it would have been possible also to evaluate the ﬁt of the SVAR
estimates by comparing its impulse–responses with those simulated by the calibrated DSGE
Fig. 2. Filtered probabilities of the three models: for model A ( ) and C ( ) the filtered probabilities
are for being in the low volatility regime (regime 1) and for model B ( ), for which volatility is the same
in the two regimes, they are for being in expansion (regime 2)
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Table 2. Model selection criteria and tests†
Model BIC LR
A 15.8 (16.17) 294.9
B 16 (16.33) 59.4
C 15 (15.03) 271
†BIC refers to the values of the Bayesian infor-
mation criterion for a Markov regime switching
SVARof order 1; its values for aMarkov regime
switching SVAR of order 2 are reported in the
parentheses. LR refers to the value of the likeli-
hood ratio test against the presence of a single
regime (linearity) and in all cases it is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
model since theDSGEmodelwould be the log-linearized approximationof the SVAR.However,
in practice, this route is hardly accessible because even under the most implausible assumption
that such a DSGE model can be conceptualized (and, crucially, become widely accepted), it
may be of little practical use: although aDSGEmodel generally has a ﬁnite order VAR solution
in all its variables, it is highly unlikely that this will also be so when only the observable variables
are included (see for example Kapetanios et al. (2007).)
Moreover, it is also worth noting that, although, at ﬁrst glance, it may seem tempting to
remove some of the insigniﬁcant variables, to, maybe, improve the accuracy of the estimates
of the impulse–responses, there are two important points that we should bear in mind. First,
although the results are not reported, the dropped-out variables proved essential in identifying
the regimes reasonably (in terms of the general perception of what was the state of the UK
macroeconomy during the sample period considered). This should not be a surprise since the
idiosyncratic elements of the remaining series are givenmore weight in the smaller-scale systems
than they are when all the variables are used instead. Second, although uncertainty would still
be a feature of the variables that comprise the (smaller-scale) system, the system itself would
hardly be classiﬁed as mirroring the state of the macroeconomy, which, as we previously note, is
actually essential for our analysis. (As we explained earlier, we have purposely adopted the same
set-up with the prevalent SVAR that solves aNeo-KeynesianDSGEmodel of amacroeconomy,
which we augment with an inward FDI variable.) For these two reasons, we do not consider the
smaller-scale econometric models.
Fig. 3 depicts the results from ﬁttingmodel A on our data. It shows that, in either regime, FDI
ﬂows are not affected by shocks in GDP growth or interest rates. In the low volatility regime,
FDI ﬂows increase either as a result of currency appreciation or, to a lesser extent, increased
inﬂation. In the high volatility regime, FDI ﬂows decrease because of a positive shock in the
foreign exchange rate although the conﬁdence intervals suggest that the effect is at the bound-
aries of statistical insigniﬁcance. (Our expression (positive or negative) in our context has no
appraisal; it is purely the sign of the number of the shock (so a positive shock for the foreign
exchange rate means a shock that increases the value of the foreign exchange rate, and since
this is the pound–dollar rate this means that it can come either from a cheaper dollar, or from a
more expensive sterling or both).) In either case, its effect on FDI ﬂows tends to die out slowly.
Fig. 4. depicts the results from ﬁtting model B to our data. It shows that the results are similar
to those of model A in both regimes. FDI is not affected by shocks in GDP growth or inﬂation.
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Fig. 3. Impulse–response graphs based on model A: (a) responses of the percentage change of the inward
FDI to a shock of each variable based on the first (low volatility) regime of model A; (b) respective responses
based on the second (high volatility) regime; the graphs also depict the 16% and 84% confidence intervals
(see for example Uhlig (2005)) obtained by the bootstrap
In the low volatility regime FDI increases either by positive changes in the foreign exchange
rates or positive interest rate changes, whereas in the high volatility regime FDI decreases either
by positive changes in foreign exchange rates primarily or positive interest rate changes more
severely initially and less so later. The conﬁdence intervals indicate that the effect of foreign
exchange rates is at the boundaries of being statistically signiﬁcant whereas the effect of interest
rate changes, although in the same direction, is clearly not signiﬁcant.
Finally, Fig. 5. depicts the results from ﬁtting model C on our data. Predictably, it shows
18 N. Driffield and M. Karoglou
(a)
(b)
R
es
po
ns
e 
of
 F
D
I
R
es
po
ns
e 
of
 F
D
I
R
es
po
ns
e 
of
 F
D
I
R
es
po
ns
e 
of
 F
D
I
Fig. 4. Impulse–response graphs based on model B: (a) responses of the percentage change of the inward
FDI to a shock of each variable based on the first regime of model B; (b) respective responses based on the
second regime; the graphs also depict the 16% and 84% confidence intervals obtained by the bootstrap
that the results are roughly averaging the effect of the two regimes of model A and model B.
Speciﬁcally, FDI ﬂows are not affected by shocks in growth and inﬂation, whereas the effect of
foreign exchange rate and interest rate changes is negative albeit insigniﬁcant (marginally in the
former case, and overtly in the latter).
Overall, the purpose of our approach has been to explore in more detail the relationship
between inward investment into the UK and the principal macroeconomic variables, while
accounting for uncertainty. For this, we have explored the key distinction between periods of
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Fig. 5. Impulse–response graphs based on model C: responses of the percentage change of the inward
FDI to a shock of each variable based on model C; the graphs also depict the 16% and 84% confidence
intervals obtained by the bootstrap
high and low volatility, which are found to coincide often although not always with periods
of recession and expansion respectively, by using a Markov regime switching speciﬁcation of
an SVAR to isolate the effect of a shock in each variable on FDI. The results show, perhaps
not surprisingly, that, in periods of high volatility, a positive shock in exchange rates only
(i.e. a one-period appreciation of exchange rates) deters FDI. Conversely, a negative shock in
exchange rates (i.e. a one-period depreciation of exchange rates) increased the growth of inward
investment, hence spurring FDI. However, this effect, although substantial in size, was hardly
statistically signiﬁcant.
In contrast, in periods of low volatility, the results are effectively reversed; and, although the
effects are at the boundaries of statistical signiﬁcance, they are persistent since they affect the
growth of FDI and not just its level. And, on top of that, inﬂation seems also to have a lesser
albeit statistically signiﬁcant role to play. This result is one that to the best of our knowledge
has not been reported in the empirical literature. In the theoretical literature by Campa (1993),
there is only a speculation that uncertainty deters FDI. This, however, is expressed in a different
manner from the few (typically cross-country panel studies) that seek to link within-year cur-
rency ﬂuctuations to FDI ﬂows. We show that the situation is rather more complex than this,
as expressed by the ‘Gordian knot’ discussion of Pain and van Welsum (2003), but that, unlike
previous analyses, we can highlight the precise nature of the relationship between exchange rate
changes andFDI. It appears that, in periods of lowvolatility, the prospect of increased returns (in
home currency) resulting from an appreciation in sterling increases the volume of FDI, whereas,
in periods of high volatility, the increases in riskmean that the high cost in home currency deters
FDI. Conversely, the prospect of decreased returns resulting from a depreciation in sterling de-
creases the volume of FDI in periods of low volatility, whereas, in periods of high volatility, the
increases in risk mean that the low cost in home currency attracts FDI. Interestingly, in either
regime, the FDI ﬂows seem unaffected by shocks in growth and interest rates.
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6.1. How can the results be used to examine the effect of Brexit on foreign direct
investment
If we take the results at face value then the question about the possible effect of Brexit on inward
FDI is essentially answered by making informed conjectures about
(a) whether Brexit will drive the UK into a period of economic uncertainty that will manifest
in the macrovariables or not and
(b) what will happen to exchange rates and inﬂation (primarily) and to interest rates (secon-
darily).
In terms of conjecture (a) it seems only reasonable to assume that there will be a period of
economic uncertainty although, in the near-zero growth, inﬂation and interest rates period, such
uncertainty is still debatable as it canmanifest in themacrovariables. In fact, it seemsmore likely
that the economy will remain in the low volatility period or return to that quite quickly. Besides,
by examining the ﬁltered probabilities of all three models (see Fig. 2) it becomes evident that,
whenever the economy moved to the high volatility regime, it did not stay there for long and
soon reverted to the low volatility regime. In terms of conjecture (b) there was a depreciation of
exchange rates following the referendum,which, depending on the strength of the exchange rates
transmissionmechanism,will cause further inﬂationary pressures that the Bank of Englandmay
try to counter by increasing interest rates, which in turn should also reverse, at least partially,
the exchange rate depreciation. However, our results suggest that the effect of the exchange
rates on FDI is much stronger (and signiﬁcant) than the effect of inﬂation and interest rates.
Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the overall outcome will be a substantial and
persistent decrease in inward FDI. Our results suggest that any short-term beneﬁts from the
high volatility regime are statistically insigniﬁcant; besides, such a scenario is rather unlikely
when growth, inﬂation and interest rates are near zero.
7. Conclusions
This paper seeks to make two contributions. First, we explore why there is a lacuna between
the theoretical literature which predicts an inverse relationship between host country exchange
rate appreciation and FDI ﬂows, and the empirical literature which at best ﬁnds only a weak
relationship that is relatively unstable over time.We explore this in the context of two alternative
states of the world: one in which the economy is in a low volatility regime, and one in which it
is in a high volatility regime.
Second, in terms of the UK’s potential Brexit, we obtain ﬁndings that are informative on two
levels. Firstly, there is a high degree of uncertainty over Brexit and what the effects on the UK
economy will be. Although the advocates of the UK’s leaving the EU changed their position
through 2017, and are adamant that they nowwish theUK to leave the customs union, there is a
high degree of uncertainty around the effects of withdrawing from many of the institutions that
support and manage the free-trade area. At the time of writing (September 2018) this appears
to be the dominant position of the Conservative Party, but they are facing opposition, not just
from the political opposition, who seem to favour staying in the customs union, but also from
within their own party, and from bodies such as the Confederation of British Industry and the
Institute of Directors. As many business leaders and political commentators are arguing, this
may lead to a period of instability, following the referendum and the period afterwards while the
terms of exit (and re-entry into the free-trade area) are negotiated, although it is quite unclear
about whether, how and to what extent this instability will manifest itself in the macrovariables.
In terms of the future, we can at this stage speculate that the possibility that the UK will ‘crash
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out’ of the EU with no deal makes more likely that inward FDI may be deterred for longer.
Indeed, UnitedNations Conference on Trade andDevelopment (2018) data suggested that FDI
in the UK in new activity was down 90% since the referendum.
Perhaps the greatest effect of Brexit in terms of its effect on inward FDI is not Brexit itself,
but what it implies. We have not discussed in any detail in this paper the prospects for foreign
investors leaving theUK (though of course a signiﬁcant proportion of newFDI is (re)investment
by existing ﬁrms). However, compared with other forms of capital inﬂow, it is clear that foreign
disinvestment will be slower than other forms of capital outﬂow. Nevertheless, although it is
doubtlessly true that these other forms of capital outﬂow will have a faster detrimental effect on
theUK economy, to understand the signiﬁcance of FDI ﬂows, we need to understand the nature
of foreign investment decisions. As Drifﬁeld and Munday (2000) showed, foreign investment
into the UK occurs with a 2–3-year lag between the decision’s being taken and the investment.
This holds for expansion or reinvestment as well as for new investment. For example, decisions
regarding the location of new production lines in the automobile sector for 2021 have already
been taken, and decisions for 2024 are due by 2020. As such, the lack of new investment is
similar in effect to exit, as it implies de facto a relocation away from the UK. It is also likely to
cause a move of supporting sectors and supply chains away from the UK, and an increase in
imports.
It is reasonable to assume, for example, that on the basis of the present direction of travel of
the UK Government, and its so-called neo-liberal agenda, we shall see an increase in the types
of policies that are designed to improve UK cost competitiveness. This means, for example,
further increases in labour market ﬂexibility, reductions in employment protection and greater
trade with low cost locations such as Asia although it is still a matter of some debate, even
within the governing party.
At the same time, however, it is palpable that Brexit already puts and will continue to put
pressure on UK exchange rates. One hitherto unexplored relationship concerns the interaction
between uncertainty and currency depreciation. In times of uncertainty, devaluation of cur-
rency deters new investment, irrespective of the fact that it makes the investment ‘cheaper’ in a
ﬁrm’s home currency. Taken together, therefore, it is not clear that many macroeconomic policy
responses are open to the government to alleviate the impact of Brexit on inward investment.
Rather, building on the wider work in this area, the results suggest a micro- or place-based
approach to alleviating uncertainty experienced by ﬁrms. As a result of these pressures, the UK
may pursue more interventionist policies directly targeting inward investment, such as the types
of incentive that were paid before the UK entered the single market. Such policies have proved
popular with inward investors, and, allied to the greater labour market ﬂexibility in the UK
compared with countries such as Germany and France, have long been linked with the histor-
ically high levels of inward investment in the UK. The UK may be in position to offer more
favourable inward investment incentives when not bound by EU rules on state aid, though they
tend to work only in the short term. Rather, as Los et al. (2017) suggested, what is required is
a series of interventions to protect supply chains, through for example investment in skills, and
boosting small ﬁrms through access to ﬁnance, so that more activity along the whole chain is
attracted to the UK. The effectiveness of this, however, will depend on the relative tariff and
non-tariff barriers of supplying theUK from the EUor vice versa.Moreover, our results suggest
that, to remain competitive in attracting inward investment, the incentives that are offered will
need to be sizable andmay contravene the trade relationships that the UKwill seek to formwith
the EU. There has been some speculation that reduced tax rates may offset some of the negative
effects of Brexit, though at the same time tax competition may alienate the EU even further.
Irrespectively therefore of what precise institutional arrangements the UK agrees with the EU,
22 N. Driffield and M. Karoglou
we expect inward investment to fall in themedium term, though some trade-offs may be possible
as sector level agreements develop. It is this area where we feel that future work should focus.
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